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AbstrAct
Asymmetry in warfare is not a new phenome-
non. Historically, it has been observed that 
on various occasions there has been a marked 
difference in the relative military power and 
strategy of the warring states. However, in the 
post 9/11 era, it has been observed that the 
character and nature of war itself is changing 
particularly amid the wars between state and 
non-state actors. The usage of unconventio-
nal tools and tactics, be it guerrilla warfare 
or terrorism or irregular warfare or any other 
forms are becoming more synonymous with 
non-state entities. All this is leading to a com-
position of warfare in which a non-state actor 
is using asymmetric methods to target the 
state’s vulnerabilities to achieve disproportio-
nate effect. This paper debates the notion of 
Asymmetric Warfare, the characters of actors 
involved and the nature of the state’s response 
in the 21st century.
Key words: Asymmetric, warfare, strate-
gy, non-state actor, terrorism.
guerras asimétricas:  
un conflicto entre estado 
versus actores no estatales
resumen
La asimetría en la guerra no es un fenómeno 
nuevo. Históricamente, se ha observado que 
en varias ocasiones ha existido una marcada 
diferencia en el relativo poder militar y estra-
tégico de Estados en guerra. Sin embargo, en 
la era pos 9/11, se ha observado que el carácter 
y la naturaleza de la guerra está cambiando, 
particularmente en las guerras entre actores 
estatales y no estatales. El uso de herramientas 
y tácticas no convencionales, ya sea guerra de 
guerrillas, terrorismo, guerra irregular, o cual-
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quier otra forma, está siendo más similar con 
entidades no estatales. Todo esto está llevando 
a una composición de guerra en la cual un actor 
no estatal usa métodos asimétricos dirigidos a 
las vulnerabilidades del Estado para lograr un 
efecto desproporcional. Este ensayo debate la 
noción de “guerra asimétrica”, el carácter de 
los actores involucrados y la naturaleza de la 
respuesta del Estado en el siglo xxi.
Palabras clave: asimetría, guerra, estrate-
gia, actor no estatal, terrorismo.
The history of strategic ideas and the classical 
understanding of warfare since World War I 
were largely built on the assumption that wars 
would take place among state actors. A new en-
tity, the non-state actor, brought to the centre-
stage by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, has challenged the state’s authority and 
sovereignty much more seriously than ever 
before. This unexpected terrorist assault on 
the United States can be considered to be the 
beginning of the end of Clausewitz’s theory 
of wars between the states and the concept of 
the conventional adversary’s “centre of gravi-
ty” (Clausewitz, 1984). This incident can be 
viewed as an example of a non-state actor’s 
‘victory’ over a superpower.
Historically, weak powers have sought 
to avoid an opponent’s strengths and instead 
attempted to exploit the latter’s weaknesses. 
But the application of hitherto unexplored and 
innovative means for attacking an adversary’s 
weaknesses is termed as “asymmetric warfare”. 
In a way, seeking asymmetries is fundamental 
to all wars. But in the modern context, asym-
metric warfare emphasises what is popularly 
perceived as unconventional or non-traditional 
methodologies (Hughes, 1998).
In the post 9/11 era there is a need to 
undertake detailed study analysing the asym-
metry between the state and non-state actor, as 
well as the state’s reaction to such asymmetric 
threats. However, before that, it is essential to 
put this notion of asymmetry in the context 
of present day and emerging threats. This pa-
per attempts to look at the past and present 
debate on this issue with a view that this un-
derstanding may help to define asymmetry in 
present day context. The paper also attempts 
to project some of the concerns of the modern 
world about asymmetric warfare and may help 
to provide insights for the broader formulation 
of the doctrines for state responses.
IDeA OF AsymmetrIc wArFAre
War can be said to be as old as human society 
and it certainly features prominently in the 
recorded histories of state-cultures. But it is a 
complex issue and war seems to be changing 
more quickly than ever before (Gray, 1997). 
There is great debate over the definition of war; 
the types of warfare; and why wars happen, 
even when most people do not want them to. 
Representatives of many different academic 
disciplines have separately attempted to answer 
these questions.
War is defined as an armed conflict bet-
ween two or more governments or states. 
Clausewitz (1984) defined war as “an act of 
violence intended to compel our opponent to 
fulfil our will” (p. 75). Michael Walzer (2000), 
the author of the book, Just and Unjust Wars, 
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defines war as a “legal condition, which equa-
lly permits two or more groups to carry on a 
conflict by armed forces” (p. 41). When such 
conflicts assume global proportions, they are 
known as world wars. War between different 
parts or factions within the same nation is ca-
lled civil war. Conflicts or wars in which major 
powers purposely refrain from employing all 
their armed strength are often known as limi-
ted wars (Singh, 1995). Inter-state wars are 
generally terminated by treaty and civil wars 
by a peace proclamation.
The methods and practice of war, or 
warfare, can be broadly divided into various 
types based on periods of time (like prehisto-
ric warfare, ancient warfare, modern warfare); 
by theatre, meaning where it is being fought 
(land warfare, naval warfare, air warfare); by 
type of weapons used (submarine warfare, che-
mical warfare, nuclear warfare); by the peoples 
involved (Roman warfare, Chinese warfare, 
Arab warfare) or by tactics used (like guerrilla 
warfare, siege warfare, asymmetric warfare) 
(Asprey, 1975; History of Warfare).
Despite these various manifestations of 
warfare, the early years of the 21st century seem 
to have become dominated by asymmetric 
warfare. Asymmetry means the absence of a 
common basis of comparison in respect to a 
quality, or in operational terms, a capability. 
All conflicts are asymmetric to some extent 
and the clever combatant has always exploited 
this quality. The nature of asymmetric warfare 
being dynamic, asymmetry can be categorised 
differently under different situations.
In broad terms, asymmetric warfare can 
be said to comprise three main types, namely 
strategic asymmetry, tactical asymmetry and 
war by proxy (Khan, 2005).
In the case of ‘strategic asymmetric war-
fare’, belligerents begin by deploying forces 
of a similar type, with the outcome being 
determined by the quality and quantity of 
the opposing forces. Often when belligerents 
deploy forces of a similar type, the outcome 
of a battle and/or campaign is determined by 
the numerical advantage enjoyed or better 
command and control exercised by one side.
In ‘tactical asymmetric warfare’, one si-
de enjoys a technological advantage that can 
outweigh even the numerical advantage of the 
enemy. Training and tactics as well as techno-
logy can prove decisive and allow a smaller 
force to overcome much larger forces. If the 
inferior power is in a position of self-defence; 
i.e., under attack or occupation, it may be 
possible to use unconventional tactics, such 
as hit-and-run and selective battles to exploit 
the weaknesses of the superior power, as an 
effective means of harassment without viola-
ting the laws of war. Lastly, in case of ‘war by 
proxy’, asymmetric warfare is carried out (ge-
nerally covertly) by non-governmental actors 
who are connected to or are sympathetic to a 
particular nation’s (the state actor’s) interest. 
That is, a non-state actor serves as a proxy of 
the state actor.
In his typology of asymmetry, Kenneth 
McKenzie (2000) has identified six main ty-
pes of potential asymmetric threats: nuclear, 
chemical, biological, information operations, 
operational concepts and terrorism. From the 
us point of view, types of asymmetric threats 
have been identified to include attacks by 
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wmd, regional military threats and asymmetric 
threats in which state and non-state adversaries 
avoid direct engagement but devise strategies, 
tactics and weapons to minimise us strengths 
and exploit its weaknesses (Kolet, 2001; Mc-
Kenzie, 2000).
In the post-modern warfare era, the 
character and nature of war is being altered 
by technological, social and cultural advan-
ces. At the same time, it has been observed 
that warfare is beginning to be dominated 
by unconventional tactics. War and warfare 
has been transformed from state centricity to 
a condition where reason of state no longer 
drives belligerency (Creveld, 1991). Thus, 
war in the post-modern era is experiencing 
two entirely different types of philosophies. 
One is based on technological advancements 
and is state-centric in character, while the 
other is based on usage of unconventional 
tools and tactics, and is more synonymous 
with non-state entities. At present, the act of 
a non-state actor against a state is being loosely 
termed as an act of asymmetric warfare. It is 
perceived that such warfare is threatening to 
occupy the leading edge of strategic potency, 
much as revolutionary and nuclear warfare 
occupied the third quarter of the twentieth 
century. In this context, the term asymmetry 
encompasses various tactics of war-fighting 
like guerrilla warfare, terrorism, irregular war-
fare, etc. These wars originate from conflicts 
over scarce resources, ethnic and religious 
issues, transnational crime (with its linkage 
to terrorism and insurgency), migration and 
illegal immigration, border disputes, famine 
and state collapse (Mendel, 1995-96).
However, asymmetric warfare is not a new 
concept; it dates back to the Roman occupa-
tion of Spain. Practitioners of the asymmetric 
approach concentrate limited attacks against 
regular military forces’ critical vulnerabilities 
by using treachery to undermine the over-
match of technology and aggregate forces of 
their adversaries (Metz, 2001). Indirect refe-
rences to asymmetry can also be found in the 
writings of ancient Chinese military theorist 
Sun Tzu. In his famous book, Art of War, he 
discusses subjects like unorthodox and or-
thodox tactics. Here, unorthodox tactics are 
described as tactics that are primarily realised 
through employing forces, especially flexible 
ones, in imaginative, unconventional, unex-
pected ways (Tzu, 1994). In the recent past, 
the first reference to asymmetric conflict was 
in an article on the us experience in Vietnam 
by Andrew Mack (1974; Cassidy, 2003).
The term asymmetry has multiple di-
mensions. Over the last few years, the words 
‘asymmetry’ and ‘asymmetric’ have come into 
vogue in strategic studies and political science 
discourses. Wars, enemies, battles, strategies, 
approaches, options, challenges and many 
other phenomena related to armed conflict 
have all been labelled asymmetric. Given this 
multiplicity of dimensions, it is evident that 
using this concept to describe only threats may 
create confusion in the minds of commanders. 
Hence, asymmetry must mean more than 
“simply making maximum use of one’s ad-
vantage” or fighting differently (Blank, 2004).
An elaboration of the concept of asymme-
tric challenges to national security is found in 
one us document (Government of the United 
States, 2009):
 pi Rev Oasis 20_final.indb   100 2/17/15   3:55 PM
1 0 1
A s y m m e t r i c  W a r f a r e :  A  S t a t e  v s  N o n - S t a t e  C o n f l i c t
O T R O S  T E M A S
O A S I S ,  N o  2 0  •  J u l i o - D i c i e m b r e  2 0 1 4  •  p p .  9 7 - 1 1 1
Asymmetric approaches are attempts to cir-
cumvent or undermine us strengths while exploiting 
us weaknesses using methods that differ significantly 
from the United States’ expected method of opera-
tions…These generally seek a major psychological 
impact such as shock or confusion that affects an 
opponent’s initiative, freedom of action or will. As-
ymmetric methods require an appreciation of the 
opponent’s vulnerabilities. Asymmetric approaches 
often employ innovative, non-traditional tactics, 
weapons or technologies and can be applied at all 
levels of warfare, strategic, operational and tactical 
and across the spectrum of military operations (Metz, 
2001).
Another interpretation of asymmetrical war-
fare is that of irregular warfare or unconven-
tional warfare as defined by Robert J Bunker 
(1999). He defines unconventional warfare 
as a form of conflict, other than conventional 
wars, waged by the army of a nation-state. In 
this view, asymmetric warfare is mostly co-
vert war, waged at low intensity by guerrilla 
groups, religious cults, drug cartels and even 
special force components of regular armed 
forces. Thus, amongst the practitioners and 
propagators of asymmetric/unconventional 
war are Sun Tzu, Lettow, te Lawrence, Lenin, 
Mao, and modern guerrilla leaders like Che 
Guevara and Marighella (Bunker, 1999, p. 
141; Bhonsle, 2004).
Also, over the years, some attempts have 
been made to systematically analyse the outco-
me of asymmetric conflicts and a few have 
seen the asymmetries, which characterise the 
conflict as being critical to an understanding 
of the outcome. Rosen (1972) considers as-
ymmetry in power and “willingness to suffer 
costs”; Katzenbach (1962) examines the asym-
metry in “tangible” and “intangible resources”; 
Galtung (Mack, 1975) distinguishes between 
“social” and “territorial defence” (asymmetry 
in goals); Kissinger (1969) mentions asymme-
try in overall strategy (physical versus psycho-
logical attrition); and Kraemer distinguishes 
“colonial” versus “non-colonial” guerrilla 
wars (Mack, 1975). Successful asymmetric 
tactics used by non-state actors in the last few 
decades have proved that asymmetric war is a 
contest of will. Psychological defeat is often 
much more damaging and longer lasting than 
battlefield reverses. Arguably, the easiest way 
to achieve this is to attack the enemy where it 
feels most comfortable and confident (Goul-
ding, 2000-01).
Today, leading thinkers assert that we 
have witnessed a revolution in political affairs, 
with the major powers now unlikely to go to 
war with each other. Rather, they are more 
likely to intervene in conflicts involving weak 
states, militia groups, drug cartels and terro-
rists (Freedman, 1998). This theory holds 
well, not only for major powers, but also for 
some developing powers that understand the 
limitations of wars in conflict resolution. At 
the same time, in a few cases, some weak states 
have challenged the state’s authority and suc-
ceeded. The most well-known example is the 
Vietnam-America war. During the last few de-
cades, however, a new phenomenon has been 
observed wherein some weak powers / failing 
states have started challenging the authority 
of strong powers by covertly supporting non-
state actors.
Asymmetric warfare is not synonymous 
with terrorism. The current literature libera-
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lly uses terminologies like asymmetric actor 
and terrorist interchangeably. However, in 
pre-empting the terrorist are we really dealing 
with asymmetry, or is something else at work? 
Thinking of the threat as only asymmetric 
misses the mark, especially if we have got the 
concept wrong. The combination of asym-
metry and the terrorists’ ability to continually 
devise idiosyncratic approaches presents the 
real challenge. Assessing the distinction and 
interrelationship between these two factors 
provides us with the initial understanding 
required to tackle the resultant operational 
challenges.
Terrorism is a part of a tactic used by the 
weaker side in an asymmetric conflict. But, at 
times, it is also called asymmetric warfare by 
advocates for partisans using terrorist methods 
to avoid any pejorative connotations; likewise, 
occupying powers often label partisans as “te-
rrorists” as part of propaganda campaigns to 
maintain support in their home country and 
to win over the occupied people so as to cut 
off the partisans’ principal support base. This 
is the root of the phrase “One man’s terrorist 
is another man’s freedom fighter” (Assymme-
tric Warfare).
Asymmetric engagements are battles bet-
ween dissimilar forces. These engagements can 
be extremely lethal, especially if the force being 
attacked is not ready to defend itself against 
the threat (Alred, 1995). Similarly, asymmetric 
warfare has been described as war between two 
sides with very dissimilar goals (Libicki, 1997), 
which makes the fight inherently asymmetrical 
from the start. The term “non-traditional” is 
also used to define asymmetric warfare be-
cause it employs methods that do not fit into 
our traditional picture of warfare–big armies 
pitted against each other on the battlefield, 
using similar strategy, tactics and weapons. 
Asymmetric warfare has also been called “…
using new technology to ‘defeat the superior 
with the inferior’” (Pillsbury, 1998). In broad 
terms asymmetric warfare is defined as warfare 
that involves attacking an adversary’s weaknes-
ses with unexpected or innovative means while 
avoiding his strengths (Hughes, 1998).
Asymmetric strategies attack vulnerabili-
ties not appreciated by the ‘target’ (victim) or 
capitalise on the victim’s limited preparation 
against any threat. These strategies rely (pri-
marily, but not exclusively) on concepts of 
operations that are fundamentally different 
from the victim’s and/or from those of recent 
history. They often employ new or different 
weapons. Additionally, they can serve political 
or strategic objectives that are not the same as 
those the victim pursues (Bennett et al., 1998).
All these “definitions” are acceptable, in 
turn suggesting that asymmetric warfare is a 
combination of all of them. However, regard-
less of any “definition”, the bottom line is that 
asymmetric warfare encompasses anything 
–strategy, tactics, weapons and personnel– 
that alters the battlefield to negate the other’s 
advantages. However, in order to identify the 
exact nature of asymmetry in a particular type 
of conflict/war, it is essential to narrow down 
its focus. This is essential because the existing 
definitions, while narrowly accurate, seem in-
sufficient in explaining asymmetry in respect 
of conflicts between states and non-state ac-
tors. In view of this, there is a need to establish 
a working definition of asymmetric warfare.
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Definition
Asymmetric warfare could be defined as: “a 
form of warfare in which a non-state actor 
uses unconventional tools and tactics against 
a state’s vulnerabilities to achieve dispropor-
tionate effect, undermining the state’s will to 
achieve its strategic objectives”.
unFOLDInG FrOm tHe PAst
The concept of asymmetric warfare is as old 
as warfare itself. In broad terms, asymme-
tric warfare involves attacking an adversary’s 
weaknesses with unexpected or innovative 
means while avoiding his strengths (Hughes, 
1998). Asymmetric warfare encompasses a 
wide scope of theory, experience, conjecture 
and definition; the implicit premise is that as-
ymmetric warfare deals with the unknown(s), 
with surprise in terms of ends, ways and means 
(Ancker & Burke, 2003). Some examples may 
be illustrative.
The history of Rome extends from 753 
bc. Rome’s political growth followed a line 
of development similar to that of the Greek 
city-states: limited monarchy of sorts. Rome 
fought a few battles for its survival. Post 270 
bc, Carthage (what is today Tunisia (Carthage, 
n.d.)) was Rome’s main rival in the West, as it 
was concentrating upon enlarging its empire in 
Spain. This led to the greatest and most diffi-
cult war in Roman history, the second Punic 
War, which can be termed as a classic case of 
asymmetric warfare.
The war has its origins in the attack by 
the young Carthaginian general, Hannibal, 
on Saguntum, a Spanish town, claimed by 
Rome as an ally. Rome declared war. Seizing 
the initiative, Hannibal, in an unconventional 
move in 218 bc, speed-marched an army of 
about 40,000 men, 9000 cavalry troops and 
even a detachment of African elephants across 
the Alps into Italy in 14 days, something not 
attempted before. The crossing cost him nearly 
half of his men and almost all the elephants. 
But, his tactics yielded results: Hannibal de-
feated the Romans, a superior power with 
higher degree of war waging machinery, three 
times in three years. Numerically, Hannibal’s 
forces never matched those that the Romans 
had. At Cannae, for example, where Hannibal 
won his greatest victory, some 70,000 Romans 
were wiped out by just 50,000 Carthaginians 
(Chaliand, 1994). Hannibal’s unconventional 
tactics, using raids and threats to contest a big 
and well-equipped Roman force, paid off.
Again, in the 1960s, the Americans chose 
Vietnam as a place to draw the line for com-
munist expansionism. In August 1964, a pre-
sumed North Vietnamese attack on the cruiser 
Maddox led to an American retaliatory strike. 
In February 1965, an attack on the American 
advisers’ barracks in the Central Highland city 
of Pleiku triggered a retaliatory raid. By July 
1965, the us combat units were fully commit-
ted and their troop presence began to grow, 
reaching 543,000 by early 1969 (Kissinger, 
1994). Nearly 60,000 Americans were killed 
and hundreds of thousands came home woun-
ded, either physically or mentally (Melanson, 
2005; Notes on Rome, n.d.). This war, which 
nearly lasted for more than a decade, can be re-
ferred to as a classic case of asymmetric warfare 
in recent times. In this conflict, the us forces 
were superior in every important department, 
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from firepower to manpower. What cost them 
dearly was their complete underestimation of 
the opponent. What North Vietnam lacked in 
technology and financial resources, they more 
than made up with their tenacity and com-
mitment. They were willing to pay any price 
to achieve their goals (Vietnam History 3).
Even the Persian Gulf War in 1991 saw 
asymmetric warfare (Dinstein, 1994). Iraq 
launched Scud missiles and the coalition 
used Stealth aircraft to fire precision weapons 
against the Iraqis. American air strikes on mo-
bile Scud launchers during this war were aimed 
at wrecking Iraq’s tactical capability to launch 
ballistic missiles. Here, airpower helped achie-
ve the stated American goals of “immediate, 
complete and unconditional withdrawal of 
Iraqi forces from Kuwait” and “restoration of 
Kuwait’s legitimate government” (Clodfelter, 
2002). This war proved that it is not always the 
weaker power that gains victory due to asym-
metry but occasionally, the stronger power too 
can gain victory because of its asymmetrical ad-
vantage in respect of technology and firepower. 
As these examples show, asymmetric warfare is 
using something extraordinary or never seen 
before to gain advantage (Allen).
But they also raise the basic question: 
how do the weak win wars? The likelihood 
of victory and defeat in asymmetric conflicts 
depends on the interaction of the strategies 
the weak and strong actors use. Independent 
of regime type and weapons technology, the 
interaction of similar strategic approaches fa-
vours the strong actors while opposite strategic 
approaches favour the weak2.
At the beginning of the 21st century, 
more than 60 low and medium-intensity 
wars were raging around the planet–roughly 
double the average number during the Cold 
War period. Concurrently, the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction (wmd), mul-
tiplying acts of terrorism and increasing num-
bers of “rogue” or “failed” states (which may 
possess or pursue weapons of mass destruction 
and/or support terrorists) have redefined both 
the nature of war and the concept of security.
tHe DebAte
International stability and national security has 
been challenged in the past as well. But in the 
last few decades, a new phenomenon has emer-
ged where an explosion of domestic conflict 
challenges the stability and even the existence 
of a state. Most of these domestic conflicts 
have an ethnic dimension and a few of them 
had been previously subdued by authoritarian 
state-centres. But, over time, these conflicts 
took on a different shape, with the emergence 
of non-state actors. This is because this enti-
ty became powerful enough to challenge the 
state’s authority by using asymmetric tactics.
The emergence of well-established, well-
connected and well-armed non-state actors 
has made intra-state conflicts bloodier. Un-
derstanding the connotation of present day 
asymmetry between a state and a non-state 
2 A new approach to understanding asymmetric conflicts is put forth in the forthcoming book by Ivan Arreguín-
Toft (n.d.).
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actor in the backdrop of intra-state conflicts 
is relevant for studying asymmetric warfare of 
the 21st century.
Intra-state conflicts are not a new phe-
nomenon. Since 1945, they have been more 
frequent and more violent than inter-state 
warfare (Abazi, n.d.). With the end of the Cold 
War, these tendencies increased, following the 
lines of ethno-national and separatist-armed 
conflicts, bringing a significant shift in the 
perception of security issues and alternative 
approaches to tackle them, especially in Eu-
rope. In particular, the changing dialogue of 
sovereignty, identity and security, and interna-
tional responsibility appears to have become 
increasingly significant. Considering that the 
propositions in international relations depend 
on both empirical validity and logical sound-
ness, a theoretical exercise on the case of intra-
state conflicts questions the validity of the 
traditional state-developed concept of security. 
The path is open to new interpretations and 
understanding of normative, operational and 
structural issues.
The lessons from earlier intra-state con-
flicts reveal that the traditional schools of inter-
national relations do not provide satisfactory 
tools for the understanding of “the current 
status of war and peace in the international 
system” (Abazi, n.d.). They reveal that intra-
state conflicts are no longer only a state affair. 
The distinction between inter-state conflicts 
and intra-state conflicts is getting muddled, 
and it depends from which point of view one 
is looking at the conflict. So, “if a province, 
an integrated portion of a state’s territory, or a 
fraction of the population refuses to submit to 
the centralised power and undertakes an armed 
struggle, the conflict, though a civil war with 
regard to international war, will be considered 
a foreign war by those who see the rebels as the 
expression of an existing or nascent nation” 
(Abazi, n.d.).
Nevertheless, not all internal conflicts 
can break out into asymmetric war. Intra-state 
conflicts erupt in a violent manner and beco-
me separatist movements when they “involve 
an armed confrontation between a sovereign 
independent state and a regionally-based mo-
vement, seeking to break away or seeking an 
extended form of internal territorial self-rule” 
(Abazi, n.d.). Hence, within an intra-state con-
flict, when a group challenges state authority 
in a violent manner, that group is generally 
referred to as a non-state actor.
Non-state actors also break another state 
monopoly–the monopoly on the use of force. 
While states are accountable to other states 
in the United Nations system in terms of in-
ternational law and to their own citizens (at 
least in democratically-governed countries) 
in terms of domestic law and values, violent 
non-state actors appear subject to no laws. The 
classic violent non-state actors include terrorist 
groups, insurgent armed militias and organised 
crime networks (un Global Security, n.d.).
These trends pose very real threats to the 
future of both developing and industrialised 
societies. Conventional armed conflicts–which 
are primarily intra-state in scope and geogra-
phically limited to developing regions–da-
mage the environment, disrupt economies 
and shatter societies. However, civilians suffer 
more drastically from current forms of warfare, 
which may include ethnic expulsions and even 
genocide as deliberate strategies.
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Asymmetric conflict also causes des-
truction of the financial, information and 
technological infrastructures that underpin 
modern societies. Whereas previous wars were 
between armies and nations, and largely fought 
over spheres of influence, the wars of the 21st 
century are likely to involve more shadowy 
players with very different motives. Driven 
by a growing rich-poor divide, environmen-
tal scarcity and the increasing susceptibility 
to disruption on the part of technologically 
advanced societies, future conflicts may pit 
not only nations against each other, but also 
marginalised groups within the nation against 
its elite.
Paramilitary “resistance” groups –reli-
giously and ethnically different, or not– may 
strike out against those they see, internally or 
externally, as threatening their cultural, econo-
mic or political agendas. Paramilitary “security 
forces” will intervene to protect the elite and 
maintain the status quo. And highly organi-
sed “gangs” may fight to control trafficking in 
drugs, human beings or commodities.
While ostensibly opposed, these groups 
may at times ally with each other to achieve 
specific objectives. Their tactics may include 
pre-emptive or retaliatory assassinations and 
massacres, and their targets may include in-
dividuals, government entities, civil institu-
tions and infrastructure, and corporations. In 
an increasingly chaotic world, it will be very 
difficult to tell the “good guys” from the “bad 
guys” (Global Issues, n.d.).
State support or sponsorship of insurgen-
cies was common during the Cold War era, 
as the United States, the Soviet Union, and 
various regional powers backed their favou-
red proxies, often transforming local quarrels 
into international contests. Today, states such 
as Iran, Rwanda, Angola and Pakistan, as well 
as various types of non-state supporters, play 
a major role in creating or sustaining insur-
gencies by offering fighters, training or other 
important forms of support (rand, n.d.).
Considerable debate is ongoing within 
the political and military communities as to 
the kind of responses (military or otherwise) 
that should be developed to meet the cha-
llenges of asymmetric threat posed by such 
non-state actors. Part of the debate centres on 
addressing the root cause of the problem while 
the other part concentrates on the improvisa-
tion of military techniques. Many argue that 
the lack of socio-economic progress in certain 
parts of the world is the reason for the emer-
gence of the non-state actor. However, unable 
to bear the cost of asymmetric war, particularly 
the human cost, state actors are attempting to 
incorporate rapid technological changes into 
their war fighting mechanisms.
Despite the technical and military su-
premacy enjoyed by state-actors, the future 
does not appear to lack potential threats. The 
growing gap between the haves and have-nots, 
religious tensions and lack of resources will 
fuel terrorists and extremists. There is also a 
danger that criminal elements, drug cartels 
and mercenaries or terrorists will join hands 
to create an enemy (the transnational threat), 
which will shun the battlefield and fight by 
means that will nullify the military superiority 
of conventional forces. The main tactic of such 
forces will be to exploit “asymmetries”, using 
the weaknesses inherent in a technological 
force with stand-off weaponry (Craig, n.d.). 
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The non-state actor, motivated purely by ha-
tred, revenge or religious fervour, represents 
the greatest danger to society today. There is 
even the distinct possibility that non-state ac-
tors will wage war by using weapons of mass 
destruction (Wmd).
The American invasion of Iraq repre-
sents a dilemma. The us military defeated the 
Saddam regime and its military component 
with ease, but is finding it extremely difficult 
to defeat the non-state actors through conven-
tional war fighting mechanisms. The us’ weak-
nesses stem principally from its over-reliance 
on technical solutions, ill-preparedness for an 
urban battleground and failure to fully appre-
ciate the human dimension of the problem.
Asymmetric warfare in case of a state-
non-state conflict envisages engaging the 
adversary (state) by using different tools and 
tactics. The choice of such tools and tactics 
depends on the perceptions of the non-state 
actor. While known tools like terror, blackmail 
or bargain are frequently used, on occasions, 
the non-state actor has tried to bring in the 
element of surprise by using different tech-
niques. Under this backdrop, the concept of 
asymmetry gets modified depending on the 
nature of the non-state actor.
To date, a few studies have been carried 
out in the areas of asymmetric warfare, speci-
fically those analysing the reasons behind mi-
litarily and economically less powerful states 
initiating war against relatively strong states. 
These studies have focused on the strategic and 
political considerations, and the domestic and 
international compulsions that influence the 
weaker state to launch war against its more 
powerful adversary. These studies, in a way, 
have challenged the key argument of the de-
terrence theory that the military superiority of 
the status quo power coupled with a credible 
retaliatory threat will prevent attack by cha-
llengers (Paul, 1994).
The nature of warfare has been rapidly 
changing in the last few decades. It is expected 
that in coming decades, “brush fire” wars are 
likely to increase. The recent history of warfare 
is being written more by counter-insurgency 
campaigns, hostage rescue operations, drug 
wars, low intensity conflicts, urban combat, 
etc. (Staten, n.d.). In all these cases, the attac-
ker is not a state power and methods of combat 
used by the attacker are mostly unconventio-
nal. This is rapidly changing the concept of 
asymmetry that was essentially restricted to a 
conflict between two state powers. While the 
war between the us and Vietnam is considered 
the best example of asymmetric war, in the 
post-Cold War context, the last such war was 
the one that took place against the Iraqi army 
in Kuwait and Iraq (Bishara, 2002).
In Gulf War I (1991), two state powers 
fought against each other. Here, both of the 
warring nations were answerable to an inter-
national system and in a way had parity in 
philosophy, attitude, values and beliefs. The 
asymmetric aspect lay in the differing war-
fighting capabilities and military hardware of 
the two sides. If one applies the same analogy, 
then almost all wars in the world have been 
asymmetric, as will be all future wars between 
two state actors.
But in the present era, when a non-state 
actor is challenging state authority, it is ope-
rating outside international norms and value 
systems. It is initiating a war that has no rules. 
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It is bringing out many extraneous factors to 
make the fight unequal. This emergence of the 
non-state actor has brought forward different 
dimensions of “asymmetry” on the strategic 
calculus of global geopolitics.
No single theory can be sufficient to 
explain this new form of “asymmetry”. The 
non-state actor has brought in a strange form 
of warfare, one where, for example, military 
force plays a much smaller (though still criti-
cal) role, often supporting initiatives that are 
more political, diplomatic and economic. This 
strangeness is blurring the distinction between 
war and peace. Some analysts are predicting 
that the resultant non-linearity may lead to 
the disappearance of definable battlefields or 
fronts, and even the distinction between ‘ci-
vilian’ and ‘military’ may disappear (dninet).
While earlier asymmetry was more of a 
‘di-symmetry’, meaning a quantitative diffe-
rence in firepower and force, a strong state 
against a weak one (America against Vietnam 
or Iraq), today asymmetry can be viewed as 
more of a qualitative difference in the means, 
values and style of the new enemies (Bishara, 
n.d.). This brings in the need to enlarge the 
scope of assessment of asymmetrical warfare. 
It demands the examination of asymmetric 
warfare, beyond the consideration of war as a 
technological or engineering problem. It also 
demands the assessment of asymmetric warfare 
from the point of view of the culturally distinct 
perspective of enemies. Such wars are struggles 
of psyches and wills. In such wars, the enemy 
understands that it is not possible to physically 
defeat the military forces of the state authority. 
Hence, the non-state actor challenges the state 
by using new and innovative ways.
cOncLusIOn
The concept of asymmetric challenges in case 
of non-state actors is an emerging concept. 
There is a need to address this changing con-
cept of asymmetry by looking at the system in 
its totality rather than dissecting the parts and 
studying in isolation various dimensions like 
terrorism, guerrilla warfare and urban warfare. 
Also, as this threat is both developing and evol-
ving, the nature of the state’s defence thinking, 
training, weapons, equipment, intelligence 
operations and national emergency response 
systems need to be redefined and redirected 
(Staten). There is a need to analyse the nature 
and impact of various tools and tactics used by 
non-state actors in order to decide the state’s 
responses.
Globally, it has been observed that the res-
ponses of the state towards asymmetric threat 
are not consistent and have varied from regi-
me to regime. These responses largely depend 
on the pattern and causes of the asymmetric 
threat. The responses can be dependent on 
the state’s policies towards finding solutions 
to tackling the threat.
There is a need to evolve an analytical 
framework to examine the concept of asymme-
tric warfare by looking at specific cases of state 
versus non-state conflicts. However, the entire 
gamut of asymmetric warfare should not be 
seen as a classic action-reaction-counteraction 
cycle because of the nature of actors involved 
and the unconventional nature of tools and 
tactics used by them to wage a war.
It is essential to understand the implica-
tions of such wars on the states’ overall security. 
Unfortunately, the most difficult issue in case 
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of asymmetric warfare is that of threat iden-
tification and even response development. A 
problem with efforts to define an asymmetric 
threat is that they imply strongly that the uni-
verse of threats divides neatly into symmetric 
and asymmetric. It is difficult to qualify or 
quantify asymmetric threat if one extrapolates 
the argument “one person’s terrorist is another 
person’s freedom fighter” to “one culture’s 
asym metric threat is another culture’s standard 
modus operandi” (Gray, 1997, p. 5).
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